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Abstract 
This paper is an exploration of the reappraisal that has been taking place since the 1980s of 
Confucianism’s suitability for a modernized society. The first section focuses in particular 
on the discussion that took place in Singapore on Confucianism as a stimulant for 
economic activity, arguing that it was first and foremost a politically motivated attempt to 
establish Confucianism as a convenient ideology. I then move to a discussion of recent 
attempts to rehabilitate Confucianism in the PRC. In the final section, I suggest how 
Confucianism can be a healthy antidote to some of the ills produced by contemporary 
capitalist practice. 
Keywords: Confucianism, modernization, capitalism, consumerism 
Izvleček 
Ta članek raziskuje prevrednotenje primernosti konfucionizma za modernizacijo družbe, ki 
se odvija od 1980. Prvi del se osredotoča predvsem na razpravo, ki je potekala v 
Singapurju o konfucianizmu kot poživilu za gospodarske dejavnosti, z utemeljitvijo, da je 
bil najprej in predvsem politično motiviran poskus vzpostavitve konfucionizma kot 
priročne ideologije. Nato preidem na razpravo o nedavnih poskusih vnovične rehabilitacije 
konfucionizma v Ljudski republiki Kitajski. V zadnjem poglavju pa predlagam, kako je 
lahko konfucionizem zdrav protistrup za nekatere tegobe, ki jih proizvajajo sodobne 
kapitalistične prakse. 
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Introduction: The Changing Meanings of Confucianism 
The term “Confucianism”, whether in its Western version or its Chinese 
equivalent rujia 儒家, is gradually receiving a new, while still inchoate, signifi-
cation. Its meaning will probably never be entirely clear, nor, I argue, has it ever 
been. As with any complex philosophy or ideology with a long history, it is not––
and most likely should not be––easily definable. While a number of specific 
Confucian values, approaches and notions can be identified, Confucianism’s lack 
of indispensable foundations or dogmas eschews rigorous definitions. What is at 
least clear, however, is that its point of reference in academic and even public 
discussion has recently been undergoing considerable changes. Today, 
“Confucianism” is beginning to literally mean something rather different from 
what it did only three decades ago when it was predominantly understood as the 
major stream of thought in ancient China, and, somewhat more narrowly, as the 
ruling ideology of the Chinese dynasties. Back then, however, and during most of 
the 20
th
 century, Confucianism was only rarely presented as a viable or desirable 
way of thinking. On the contrary, in fact, it was largely rejected, and sometimes 
even persecuted, as a relic of the past and the primary culprit of China’s alleged 
stagnation during the last few centuries of dynastic rule (Chen 2011, 205). 
The fact, however, that not everyone rejected Confucianism in this manner 
should not be understated. A number of philosophers in Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
for instance, significantly upheld the reverence for the Confucian enterprise during 
the 20
th
 century. Thinkers who held comparable views were certainly also present 
in the People’s Republic of China, while state repression provided little if any 
possibilities for them to expound their views without running the risk of suffering 
serious personal consequences. Some prominent Western sinologists, moreover, 
engaged themselves critically but in many cases also constructively with 
Confucianism as a philosophical tradition worthy of consideration.  
But the link with modernization was rarely, if at all, made until in the 1980s. 
Indeed, until very recently, few Western sinologists or other academics would 
even dare mention Confucianism and modernity in the same sentence. It would 
simply not occur to the majority of them that Confucianism might have anything 
to offer to a “modern” or “modernizing” society. While certainly of indisputable 
historic importance, Confucianism tended to be regarded as comparable perhaps to 
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medieval Christianity, a previously powerful ideology that had all but outlived its 
days.
1
 
The decisive first steps taken towards a reevaluation of Confucianism were 
taken in the 1980s. While dialogues took place in China and Taiwan about 
Confucianism’s suitability for a modernized society, it was in Singapore that 
Confucianism was first suggested as a potential catalyst for modernization after 
Lee Kuan Yew’s government introduced Confucian ethics in the secondary 
curriculum in 1982. What ensued was a major philosophical, sociological and 
economic discussion hosted by the Institute of East Asian Philosophies (IEAP), 
which was established at the National University of Singapore in 1983, about 
Asian and notably Confucian values as an appropriate platform for social and 
economic modernization. The aim seemed to be taken towards a Confucian revival, 
or perhaps rather inception, as it is questionable whether Confucianism had ever 
been a strong cultural force in the city state. The government-sponsored Confucian 
programme in Singapore sought to find values and motivations inherent in 
Confucianism that could establish it as being parallel to the Protestant ethic in its 
Weber-inspired image, i.e. as a cultural force informing ways of living that forge 
ahead capitalism, industrialization and modernization. Apparently, hopes were 
high that an Asian cultural stimulant for a social and economic progress 
comparable to earlier breakthroughs in Euro-America would be discovered and 
affirmed. Confucianism was perceived as an important strand in and aspect of 
what came to be called “Asian values”, a broader cultural base on which 
modernization could be constructed while westernization could be avoided. 
But not everyone was in such a hurry to come to the desired conclusion. Tu 
Weiming, the well-known scholar of Confucianism, then based at Harvard 
University, was brought into the dialogue as a leading authority in the field. As Tu 
is generally considered a champion of Confucianism, one would have expected 
him to be eager to identify and affirm its positive and modernizing effects. But Tu 
is also a careful and thorough scholar. One may surmise that he failed to fulfil the 
high expectations of his hosts as he was unwilling, as published in a later paper, to 
                                                 
1 Besides the many May Fourth and Maoist denouncements of Confucianism in 20th century China, a 
prominent view of Confucianism as a relic of the past is found in Joseph R. Levenson’s monumental 
Confucian China and its Modern Fate, in which he concludes that “Confucian civilization” is merely 
historically significant in much the same way as ancient Greek and Egypt civilizations (Levenson 
1958–1965, 3: 123f.). 
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subscribe to the thesis that Confucianism “provides a necessary background and 
powerful motivating force for the rise of industrial East Asia”, arguing that  
the method of finding the functional equivalent of the Protestant ethic in the 
“modernized” or “vulgarized” Confucian ethic is too facile, simple-minded, 
and mechanistic to merit serious attention. (Tu 1993, 8)  
He further wrote: 
The question, In what sense has the Confucian ethic contributed to the 
economic dynamics of industrial East Asia? seems less interesting than a 
much more profound subject of investigation: How does the Confucian 
tradition, in belief, attitude, and practice, continue to impede, facilitate, and 
guide the modern transformation in East Asia and, in the process, how is it 
being rejected, revitalized, and fundamentally restructured? (Tu 1993, 13) 
It appears that Singapore’s endorsement of Confucianism as a modernizing power 
was largely intended as a self-fulfilling prophecy. An ideology convenient for an 
authoritarian regime was to be established on the grounds that it was the cultural 
basis of Singapore’s economic success story. Thus, the discussion was first and 
foremost ideologically driven rather than searching for real understanding, while a 
number of good scholars participating in the dialogue certainly aimed at and 
contributed to the latter. By concocting a Confucian cultural foundation, the 
People’s Action Party under Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership had found a vindication 
for continuing its authoritarian rulership in a period of world history characterized 
by growing demands for stronger democratic principles. The state was attempting 
to “naturalise, validate, and ironically reunite (Chinese) Singaporeans with a 
presumed moral and philosophical code.” (Yew 2011, 277) Ong Pang Boon 王邦
文, a first generation People’s Action Party politician, and an outspoken critic of 
the Confucian programme, warned that  
successive generations of monarchs had always made use of and promoted 
those parts of Confucianism that were advantageous to feudal rule. (Hong and 
Huang 2008, 105)  
In this respect, it is illuminating that in the 1970s and into the mid-1980s, the 
Singapore leadership praised and encouraged “rugged individualism” until it 
suddenly began endorsing a Confucian kind of collectivism, duty and self-sacrifice. 
(Englehart 2000, 555) 
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The Confucian programme in Singapore turned out largely to be a failure, 
most decisively due to fear by other ethnic groups that the country was being 
Sinicized, but also because of scarce interest and even opposition by the Chinese 
population (Yew 2011, 277). The Institute of East Asian Philosophies was 
changed in 1990 to the Institute of East Asian Political Economy (IEAPE) and 
given different tasks in line with its new name.
2
 
Around the same time in the People’s Republic of China, or in the wake of the 
Four Modernizations campaign launched at the end of the 1970s, a radical 
reexamination of Confucianism began taking place. This was a time calling for a 
thorough reconsideration of the present and future status of the various ideological, 
philosophical and religious forces in the PRC. Much of the discussion during the 
first years revolved around Confucianism’s adaptability to the official Marxist 
state-ideology. This particular issue was of broader political nature and applied to 
major religions such as Buddhism and Christianity as well. But Confucianism’s 
historical and cultural status is only partly comparable to that of other religions 
and therefore required a more differentiated treatment. Not only is Confucianism 
not represented by some kind of ideological establishment, such as a church, but it 
was and still is considered by many as some kind of locus or core of Chinese 
culture that transcends any ideological categories, or, as Li Zehou 李泽厚 has put 
it, a “psycho-cultural construct” beyond the manipulation of human will. (Song 
2003, 88) Thus, an acceptance of Confucian deep-seated social and cultural 
influences would call for an investigation into its compatibility with a modernizing 
society. 
While the discussions in China and Singapore were set against different 
backdrops, the former was somewhat influenced by the latter. For instance, some 
of the participants, such as Tu Weiming, were active both in China and in 
Singapore. The cultural implications of Singapore’s notion of “Confucian 
capitalism” (rujia zibenzhuyi 儒家资本主义) may to some extent be meaningfully 
compared with China’s notion of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
(Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi 中国特色社会主义 ), although Confucianism’s 
impetus for economic modernization was only fleetingly addressed in China, 
perhaps, one may surmise, because China was officially still socialist and not 
                                                 
2 In 1997, the Institute of East Asian Political Economy was then changed again into the still 
operating East Asian Institute. On the opposition to and eventual failure of the Confucian programme, 
see Kuo (1996, 303ff.). 
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heading towards becoming a capitalist country. Fang Keli, an influential Marxist-
Confucian thinker, “was adamant that mainland scholars did not advocate the road 
of ‘Confucian capitalism’, and that what they were exploring was the socialist road 
to modernization with Chinese characteristics.” (Song 2003, 95) Thus, whether or 
not in line with the views of those participating in the debate, it seems that such 
considerations were more or less brushed aside and the main attention turned 
toward Confucianism as a cultural, ethical and even “religious” foundation in 
China. The 1980s debate was, after all, termed “culture craze” or “culture fever” 
(wenhua re 文化热), indicating that it revolved mostly around the search for a 
national culture suitable for China’s intention to find its place among other 
modernized nations of the world. 
Confucianism’s Present Status in the People’s Republic of China 
The “culture craze” came to a halt with the repressive political situation in China 
after the student revolts were crushed in 1989. But the question of Confucianism’s 
place in China’s future was by no means forgotten. Already in the mid-1990s it 
was becoming obvious that a reconsideration of Confucian values was inescapable. 
This has become even more obvious in the new millennium, when Confucianism 
has been enjoying positive reappraisal in China as a kernel of a new and still 
ongoing “craze” of “national learning” (guoxue 国学). A grassroots embrace of 
Confucianism is taking place, and a clear, while also clearly debated, top-down 
endorsement of Confucian culture has been occurring, manifesting itself in both 
private and public schools that teach Confucian values and virtues, university 
institutes for the furtherance of Confucian studies,
3
 not to mention the now more 
than 300 Confucius Institutes operating all over the world. While the Confucius 
Institutes are not, as many people seem to believe, specifically designed to further 
the Confucian philosophy as such, they are certainly symbolic for the radically 
changed attitude to Confucius and Confucianism in the PRC. 
A growing number of intellectuals in China are now considering Confucianism 
in a favourable manner. Some of these even explicitly endorse it as a viable 
                                                 
3 The first institute of such a kind, the Chinese Confucius Research Institute (中华孔子研究所), was 
established already in 1985 in the birthplace of Confucius, Qufu. In the new century, however, they 
have proliferated and been established at various universities in China, for instance, at Renmin 
University of China in Beijing in 2003 (孔子研究院), Qufu Normal University in 2007 (孔子文化学
院), Sichuan University in 2009 (国际儒学研究院), Shandong University in 2010 (儒学高等研究院) 
and Peking University in 2010 (儒学研究院).  
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ideology for China’s future. Others suggest it more as a practical guide for 
everyday life. Among those belonging to the first group, Jiang Qing 蒋庆 and 
Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光  are probably the best known thinkers. They differ, 
however, considerably in their approaches and motivations. Jiang, a self-
proclaimed Confucian, believes in the correctness of Confucian institutions, way 
of life and values.
4
 Kang, on the other hand, is rather a pragmatic thinker who, 
while not considering himself a Confucian, believes that the foundation of a 
unifying institute such as a “Confucian church” would have beneficial effects on 
the anomical state of Chinese society.
5
 In the second case, I am of course primarily 
referring to Yu Dan’s 于 丹  somewhat controversial but overall popular 
interpretation of the Analects.
6
  
Within the continuous educational reforms in China, Confucian values and 
insights have received and are receiving more and more attention as potential 
sources for moral education and existential meaning, not least during the previous 
leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, who “moved closer to an official embrace 
of Confucianism” and repeatedly came up with Confucian-based slogans and 
encouragements such as “harmonious society”, “filial piety” and “eight glories and 
eight shames”. (Bell 2010, 91f) It is still too early to detect the attitude of the 
present leadership to Confucianism, but on the surface it seems certainly less 
openly supportive of a Confucian-inspired policy. One may surmise that the 
bizarre case of Confucius’s statue on Tiananmen Square in 2011, erected in 
January, removed overnight in April, may be associated with a more skeptical 
attitude to Confucianism with the then incumbents-to-be. (Gardner 2011) 
Be that as it may, the growing number of positive allusions to Confucian ways 
of thinking, both in media and on the political arena in China, makes it 
increasingly urgent to come to a better understanding of their meaning. While it 
would be easy to dismiss these allusions as empty and meaningless, as much of 
Western media often does, I believe that such cynicism is unhelpful, and that we 
should rather be taking them reasonably seriously.
7
 
                                                 
4 Jiang’s ideas of Confucianism’s future political role in China are well presented in Fan (2011). 
5 The best English introduction to Kang’s suggestions and approaches is found in Gaenssbauer 
(2011). 
6 On its controversial nature, cf. Zhao (2007). 
7 Cf. Shobert (2011) who implies that in Chinese politics “Confucianism is a tool to be employed, a 
means to an end” of silencing any opposition in the country, and Roberts (2012) similarly concludes 
his article by citing a Hong Kong-based scholar who says that the “Party uses Confucianism as a tool, 
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Hence an important question is what Confucianism means, or should mean, in 
a contemporary context. This question obviously also begs the question what sort 
of form it might take in its future development in China. The second and probably 
more important question is what, if anything, Confucianism can offer modernity: 
whether it is still, or perhaps once again, relevant to modern societies. This is of 
course a topic for many dissertations and books and here I can only briefly touch 
upon a few pressing issues. 
With regard to the contemporary meaning of Confucianism, there is no simple 
and fixed definition or formulation that could fill in the blanks for us––not even 
from a historical point of view. Confucianism has a long and a highly syncretic 
history, it has, explicitly or not, been generally rather inclusive of other streams of 
thought in China, and was so pervasive in Chinese society that there were few if 
any aspects of human living that had no association with it at all. As the Confucian 
reformer Liang Qichao 梁启超 remarked in his Confucian Philosophy 儒家哲学 
from 1927, “Confucian philosophy does not equate with the whole of Chinese 
culture, but if you take Confucianism away, I am afraid that not much else will 
remain.”
8
 (cited in Zhou 2011, 27) To conflate Confucianism with Chinese culture 
would certainly be an over-generalization that left the label largely meaningless. 
But one can hardly deny that Confucianism has been pervasive in the entire 
cultural history of China. 
Confucianism has been many things and it has had many paradoxical 
manifestations––some of which were present at the same time. In its ancient form 
as philosophy, it was anti-dogmatic in nature, flexible and adaptive. During the 
Han-dynasty, it was a powerful but also a largely creative state ideology. In its 
Neo-Confucian guise, it was highly syncretic, lofty and idealistic, while also 
practical and realpolitical. In the Ming and Qing, it became inward-looking, 
somewhat dogmatic, nostalgic and thus reactionary. It was always a motivation for 
learning, although the learning it encouraged may not always have been, as it was 
meant to be, appropriate for the times. Confucianism also always justified 
hierarchy, both within family and society at large––but the hierarchy it justified 
                                                                                                                           
as a way to legitimize their rule, and as a way of criticizing Western democracy”. An editorial in Der 
Spiegel also concludes that Confucianism may be a convenient ideology for the CCP by assuming a 
misleading interpretation of a passage from the Analects (12.19): “the virtue of the junzi is like the 
wind, while that of the xiaoren like the grass. As the wind blows, the grass is sure to bend.” (Brüder 
im Geiste 2007) 
8 “儒家哲学，不算中国文化全体；但是若把儒家抽去，中国文化，恐怕没有多少东西了。” 
Asian Studies II (XVIII), 1 (2014), pp. 21–38 
29 
was often realistic and not necessarily rigid. Which of all these Confucianisms do 
people want? And is the Confucianism people want really still Confucianism? And, 
perhaps more importantly, who are these people? 
In any case, it probably goes without saying that the institutionalized, or 
indeed, politicized Confucianism of fixed moral codes and hierarchies is unlikely, 
to say the least, to gain much ground with the Chinese population at large. 
Considering its heightened exposure to persuasive “global” (i.e. predominantly 
Anglo-American) values, such as individualism, negative freedom and increased 
consumer choice, as well as other progressive social changes in China, such as 
improved women’s rights, this development will exclude, or has already excluded, 
the possibility of anything close to the formerly institutionalised Confucianism to 
be reconstructed. 
Hence, should Confucianism continue to be interpreted in a historicist manner 
by specialists on Confucianism, who tend to identify it with the reactionary Qing 
Dynasty establishment, then it would appear unlikely that the population will 
embrace the Confucian ideology. On the other hand, it is intriguing that Yu Dan’s 
highly popular interpretation of Confucianism has precisely been criticized for 
being too accommodating to the status quo; critics say “that her thinking and her 
lecturing resemble a scholar-official from the feudal society”, aiming at the 
reduction of critical social input in order to “maintain harmony”, virtually as if the 
May Fourth Movement had never existed. (Zhao 2007) And yet, however 
curiously, the public readership seems to embrace it. 
Perhaps such criticism of Yu Dan is too subtle, perhaps even pedantic. A guide 
through everyday life rooted in local culture may simply find easier access to 
people’s way of thinking and valuing than foreign self-help manuals. Even so, a 
return to a dynastic kind of Confucianism would seem entirely out of place. The 
New Confucian movement that has sought to find some commensurability 
between the Confucian philosophy and modern (or Western) institutions and 
values such as democracy, human rights, gender justice and individualism would 
seem to be the most promising for a kind of Confucianism suitable to the modern 
times. On the other hand, it must also be taken into account that Confucianism 
cannot simply be a vehicle to implement “modern” values in their Western format. 
If such values are to be adopted, as Daniel Bell has correctly observed, they must 
also be adapted (Bell 2010, 93).  
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Confucianism’s Contribution to the Modern World: A Suggestion 
Whether Confucianism is capable of adapting to modernity, however, does not 
answer the question whether it has something specific to contribute to modernity. 
In this regard, I would like to propose a suggestion. Which issues are the most 
pressing ones in modernity? Currently, economic considerations are without doubt 
the most conspicuous ones. Has Confucianism anything to contribute to these 
issues? I believe so, but in a way rather different from what people might expect. 
Let me explain. 
As touched upon in the first part of this paper, the last few decades have 
witnessed much discussion about what sort of influence Confucianism would have 
(and has had) on capitalist enterprise. Although the Chinese Communist Party was 
prone to regard Confucians as “capitalist-roaders”, Confucianism had, in history, 
probably somewhat restraining effects on commerce and market forces, as it 
assigned merchant activity a very low social status, which, admittedly, was rather 
a reflection mainly of Legalist views. (Hansen 2000, 99) This tendency has been 
criticized by some historians as having inhibited the development of Chinese 
society, eventually causing it to lapse behind the Western powers (e.g. Fairbanks 
and Goldman 2006, 179ff). There is probably some truth in this, but today we may 
need to reevaluate this entire historical development as it has arguably triggered a 
number of grave problems in the world at large, social, moral, environmental and 
even existential. Indeed, considering the long-term interests of humanity and other 
living beings on the planet, the narrative of the West’s success may in fact turn out 
to be simply a brief preface to the horror story of humanity at large. 
There are other and more recent arguments for considering Confucianism in 
fact a catalyst for capitalist activity. I will not go into detailed discussion of these 
arguments here, but briefly explain my conviction that most of these are actually 
misguided, partially resting upon a mistaken interpretation of Max Weber’s 
Protestant Ethics thesis as an explanation of, let alone a blueprint for, desirable 
progress. Weber was concerned about the process of increased rationalization 
(Rationalisierung) in the Western way of living, thinking and valuing, certainly 
triggering a more systematic approach to organized co-existence, but also leading 
to depersonalization, loneliness and isolation. The fateful factor in this process was 
the quest for money-making, stimulated unintentionally by certain Protestant 
theological interpretations, and leading to the unique Western capitalist system, 
which Weber envisaged as becoming dominant in Western culture with all its 
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inhumane and deplorable consequences.
9
 In this process, money-making becomes 
not only a rationalized activity but one that takes precedence over all other human 
activities: it becomes an end in itself. According to Weber, the unique feature of 
Occidental capitalism derives from its reliance upon an inner motivation to strictly 
organize our mundane life in such a way that virtually all of our actions contribute 
to the accumulation of capital. But not only is this an absurd and meaningless way 
of living, it also has profoundly negative consequences for human civilization and 
the “quality” of the human creatures being moulded by such a framework of 
values when gaining ascendancy in our societies.
10
 Weber would certainly have 
agreed that the process of rationalization has brought many improvements to 
Western societies, but considering his ironic remarks towards the end of his 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, it seems evident that he did not 
regard the “capitalist revolution” as a civilizational progress, and in fact rather the 
opposite:  
For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: 
“Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that 
it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.” (Weber 1930, 
182)  
Thus, to base one’s quest for cultural factors giving rise to social progress on 
Weber’s thesis seems seriously misguided unless it is utilized as a powerful 
critique of modernity’s ills.  
There is in any case a pressing need to reform the global capitalist system and 
radically reconsider the underlying values that help to maintain it. Marxism or 
socialism, at least of the conventional kind, is probably not that effective, not only 
because of its painful repressive history that has made it unattractive, but also 
because it is based on the fundamental idea that the system needs to be overturned 
before the way people think can be changed. We should have ample examples 
from history to realize to what sort of results such efforts tend to lead. 
Confucianism starts at the other end, with pedagogy, and seeks to instil certain 
                                                 
9 Tu Weiming (1984, 86) observes in this respect that “the Protestant ethic that has contributed to the 
rise of capitalism in the West has led to all kinds of problems such as excessive individualism and 
excessive rights-consciousness. (...) Excessive self-interest has led to the fragmentation of the 
individual, the generation gap and other problems of similar gravity.” 
10 It is illuminating for Weber’s overall project that when hard-pressed by his critics to explain the 
focal point of his extensive comparative social and cultural investigations of which the Protestant 
Ethic was a part, he himself said that it was “not the advancement of capitalism in its expansion that 
was of central interest” to him, “but the evolution of the humankind [Menschentum] shaped through 
the confluence of religiously and economically dependent factors.” (Weber 1978, 303)  
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values and ways of thinking that contribute to a flourishing human co-existence 
and may even be necessary for the future of human societies and life on earth as a 
whole. Should it be unclear whether Confucian traits are likely to have a 
stimulating effect on industrial producer capitalism, it seems far less compelling 
when considering our modern consumer capitalist system. For Confucians would 
in most circumstances be reluctant consumers and generally rather frugal. 
Interestingly, however, they would not see anything wrong as such with material 
wealth to the extent that it simply provides conditions for good living. At first 
glance, this may seem contradictory, but, as will be clear, a closer look at the 
Confucian teachings reveals that it is not. Ruiping Fan has made the following 
observation about the Confucian attitude to material wealth: 
Material rewards are accepted as generally good, so that there is a pragmatist 
affirmation and openness to various means (such as central planning, the 
market, or both) as the source of monetary wealth, which is in turn a source of 
family and individual well-being. Confucians are this-worldly in pursuing a 
good life and human flourishing. They work for their families within a non-
Puritanical acceptance of material success in this world in which material 
wealth is taken as, ceteris paribus, good and not grounds for moral suspicion. 
Wealth is desirable and should be pursued, as long as one does not pursue it 
by violating morality. (Fan 2010, 233) 
Wealth, however, is not an acceptable goal in its own right, as Confucius himself 
states rather clearly in Analects 7.12:  
If wealth were an acceptable goal, even though I would have to serve as a 
groom holding a whip in the marketplace, I would gladly do it. But if it is not 
an acceptable goal, I will follow my own devices. (Analects 1998)  
On another occasion, where Confucius is engaged in conversation with one of his 
disciples, he expresses his approval of the dictum “Poor but enjoying the way; rich 
but loving ritual propriety” (1.15). This view comes through more clearly in the 
following statement:  
Wealth and honor are what people want, but if they are the consequence of 
deviating from the way, I would have no part in them. Poverty and disgrace 
are what people deplore, but if they are the consequence of staying on the way, 
I would not avoid them (4.5).  
Wealth is thus first and foremost an expedient tool for improving one’s moral 
development. Other things being equal, it is to be preferred to poverty, but only 
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insofar as it will not corrupt the individual in question. After all, Confucius has 
nothing against making a nice profit:  
Zigong said, “We have an exquisite piece of jade here––should we box it up 
and put away for safekeeping, or should we try to get a good price and sell it 
off?” The Master replied, “Sell it! By all means, sell it! I am just waiting for 
the right price!” (9.3)  
Greed, egotism and extravagance, however, are all deplored. When fishing, 
Confucius himself avoided excess by using a line, not a net (7.27). Frugality is 
presented as a commendable virtue, while miserliness is not. Nevertheless, 
frugality leading to miserliness is better than extravagance leading to immodesty 
(7.36). An exemplary person (junzi 君子) is often contrasted with the petty person 
(xiao ren 小人) whose actions are motivated by narrow egotistic interests of 
personal gain instead of a sense of fairness or the desire to advance public welfare 
(4.11; 4.16). Exemplary persons, on the other hand, come to the assistance of those 
in need, but do not increase the wealth of those who are already wealthy (6.4; 
11.17).  
“I have heard,” Confucius says, “that the ruler of the state or the head of a 
household: Does not worry that his people are poor, But that wealth is 
inequitably distributed ... For if the wealth is equitably distributed, there is no 
poverty” (16.1).  
The assumption is that there are sufficient resources for everyone to live decently, 
and that scarcity is caused by individual greed of those in power. When the despot 
King Xuan of Qi confides in Mencius that he is fond of both money and sex, 
Mencius (1970, 1B.5) reassures him that such fondness is perfectly acceptable as 
long as it is shared with the people. Already in antiquity, Confucian thinkers 
identified the harmful social effects of economic inequality: “The accumulation of 
wealth” as it says in the “Great Learning” chapter of the ancient Book of Rites (Liji
礼记), “is the way to scatter the people, and the distribution of wealth is the way to 
collect the people” (Li Chi 1967 (Daxue §26)). Wealth is a means to the end of a 
good life, not an end in itself. “Virtue is the root; wealth is the branches,” as the 
Book of Rites states quite clearly (Li Chi 1967 (Daxue §26)). The point, in other 
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words, is not material goods and their acquisition and consumption, but decent 
human living.
11
 
The values nurtured in our capitalist economic system, values that capitalism 
needs in order to thrive, are, on the contrary, most certainly destructive with regard 
to social solidarity, the environment and natural resources. I would even go so far 
as to state that current capitalist practice is comparable with cancer: its demand for 
continuously increased consumption is undermining virtually all the conditions for 
life, human or non-human, to flourish on earth. There is no lack of arguments for 
this, despite the continuous efforts of powerful interest groups to diffuse them. 
Underlining the serious state of the current environmental situation in the world, a 
number of European scientists have recently called for new approaches to 
environmental issues in light of the emerging and formidable impact of human 
activity on planet earth:  
It has created a completely novel situation that poses fundamentally new 
research questions and requires new ways of thinking and acting. (Palsson 
2013, 2)  
This emerging epoch, in which human activity must “be considered a ‘driver’ of 
global environmental change”, has been referred to as the “Anthropocene” 
(Palsson 2013, 2).
12
 Asking for a healthy integration of both natural and human 
sciences in environmental studies, these scientists argue that the human being 
cannot any more be considered apart from nature, and “the environment must be 
understood as a social category”. (Palsson 2013, 4) This would seem to require 
quite novel perspectives on the nature-human relationship and may even challenge 
us to think about the categories of nature and human in new terms: 
Nature has often been presented as one half of a pair––nature/culture, 
natural/social, and so on. This is still echoed in some earth-system notions that 
are fundamentally dualistic, “linking”, “connecting”, and “coupling” the two 
systems of the earth and humans as if they were different realities. But 
                                                 
11 I provide a more detailed discussion of the Confucian (as well as Daoist and Mohist) views of 
consumption in Sigurðsson, 2014. 
12 Cf. Ellis and Haff (2009, 473): “We live in the Anthropocene: For better or for worse, the Earth 
system now functions in ways unpredictable without understanding how human systems function and 
how they interact with and control Earth system processes. Regardless of whether this transition from 
the Holocene (generally thought of as the past 12,000 years) to the new epoch of the Anthropocene 
will ultimately be for the better or for the worse, the Earth system will not be returning to a 
preanthropogenic state for the foreseeable future.” 
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recently, environmental discourse has increasingly emphasized the need to 
move beyond the stark dualism of the natural and the social. (Palsson 2013, 7) 
Some of the main reasons for such an emphasis are the outcomes of empirical 
research, suggesting that the human impact on natural occurrences and even 
genetic conditions of both humans and animals is considerably more than believed 
up to now. Thus, a strict demarcation of the human vs. the natural is increasingly 
being seen by scientists as an unrealistic reflection of the real state of affairs. 
Importantly, this awareness of the new “human condition”, to use Hannah 
Arendt’s well-known term, has profound ethical implications. A classic modernist 
approach to the environment purely as a resource for human consumption is no 
longer viable. As the aforementioned scientists point out:  
We are only part of a complex network of elements and relations that make up 
planet earth, but we are the only part that can be held responsible. (Palsson 
2013, 9)  
They go on to refer to Feminist theory and ethics of care as potential alleviators of 
this rigid modernist approach, which, despite an awareness of the need for change, 
retains us in an economic model whose aims are directly antagonistic to the 
environmental situation. 
Some of us are desperately seeking resources in our culture to deal with this 
pressing problem. This is because the only real and lasting solution can be cultural. 
Patch-up jobs on the current framework of values, way of living and views on the 
relationship between individual and mankind as a whole will not do. It is well 
worth investigating whether the Asian cultural and philosophical sensibilities, 
perhaps Confucian, Neo-Confucian or even Daoist and Buddhist ones, having 
operated for a long time in a much more “responsive” conceptual relationship with 
nature, may have something to teach us. Indeed, Confucianism with all its 
syncretic and open-ended tendencies may have had its best moments when 
incorporating elements from all these systems of thought. The yin-yang kind of 
dualism seems for instance much more realistic than our sharp-ended Platonic-
Christian-Cartesian dualism, stimulating a “softer” and certainly more moral 
relationship between man and world, and thus being more likely to contribute to 
the formation of a culture of sustainability. 
To conclude, humanity is in need of a new culture, not simply a new system. 
We need a culture, a grassroots culture that promotes certain values, according to 
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which uninhibited profit-making is simply considered an unaesthetic, a deplorable 
or a shameful activity. In this sense, something quite radical is needed, and I 
believe that there is much in the Confucian teachings, its outlook on human co-
existence, the symbiosis between human and nature and an elegant kind of human 
living, from which contemporary human beings––Chinese or non-Chinese––can 
learn. 
Confucianism is certainly not expired; it may be incompatible with modernity 
as it is, but that is because there is precisely something very wrong with modernity 
as it is, something that is in desperate need of being remedied. 
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